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APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
NATURE QF CASE 
Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, and with 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance, a second degree 
felony, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Washington 
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County, State of Utah, the Honorable James L. Shumate presiding. 
The trial was by jury. The defendant appeals the judgment of the 
Court and specifically the Court's determination at the time of 
sentencing, enhancing the minimum term of imprisonment of the 
defendant pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203.1. The 
defendant argues that any factual determinations which affect the 
defendant's substantive rights should be determined by the jury. 
The Court committed error in enhancing the defendant's sentence 
and improperly sentenced the defendant under said statute. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Is the defendant entitled to have the jury determine the 
factual issue of involvement of two or more people for the purpose of 
enhancing his sentence? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law. Utah 
appellate courts review questions of law under a correction of error 
standard with no deference to the trial court. Ward v. Richfield City. 
798 P2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990); State v. Larsen. 865 P2d 1355, 1357 
(Utah 1992); State v. Vigil. 842 P2d 843, 844, (Utah 1992); State v. 
Mitchell. 824 P2d 469, 471-472, (Utah App. 1991). 
Utah Appellate Courts review questions of fact giving great 
deference to the trier of fact. Findings of fact are reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard; they will not be set aside unless they are 
against the clear weight of the evidence or if the appellate court 
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comes to a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. 
State v. Walker. 743 P2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); State v. Murphv. 872 
P2d 480, 482 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Chavez. 840 P2d 846, 848 
(Utah App. 1992). 
The issues were preserved in the trial court, by defense 
objection on the record. (T. 303 and 318 and Sentencing Transcripts). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ANP KULES 
The text of all relevant authorities is quoted in the body of this 
brief and includes the pertinent portions of Utah Code Annotated 
§76-3-203.1; Article 1 §10 of the Utah Constitution; and the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant was charged in a criminal information with 
Count I, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 
a second degree felony, and Count II, arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance, a second degree felony. The charging 
information alleged that on or about December 30, 1994, to January 
1, 1995, the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute the same, and did agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute it in violation of Utah Code. 
The State alleged that the defendant arranged to pick up a controlled 
substance in California for distribution in Utah and made 
arrangements with local individuals to fund a portion of his trip in 
exchange for a portion of the drugs. The state also alleged that the 
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offense was done in concert with two or more individuals, thus the 
defendant was subject to an enhanced minimum sentence, pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203.1. A jury trial was held on May 
4, 1995. After presentation of the evidence, the jury found the 
defendant guilty of Counts I and II. 
The information alleged that the defendant committed Count II 
in concert with two or more individuals for purposes of enhancing 
his sentence, however, no question was put to the jury concerning 
that factual allegation. At the time of sentencing held on June 7, 
1995, and re-sentencing on November 20, 1996, defendant objected 
to the Court finding facts that the defendant committed Count II in 
concert with two or more individuals. The Court overruled said 
objections and sentenced the defendant to the enhanced minimum 
term of six years pursuant to said statute. The defendant's 
objections and the Court's ruling are found in the transcript of both 
sentencing hearings, found with the original record. 
There were major inconsistencies and wide variations in the 
testimony of the State's primary witnesses, Robert Larsen and Mary 
Nevarez. This was reiterated at the time of sentencing by Judge 
Shumate wherein he states, 'With respect to Robert Larsen, I frankly 
agree with the statements of your own counsel. Mr. Larsen was not a 
credible witness. I was impressed by him only to the extent that he 
did not seem to be able to find the truth in what he had to say.' 
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(Sentencing Transcript, 13). It was reiterated at the second 
sentencing hearing. See November 6, 1996 sentencing Transcript, 9. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At the time of sentencing, the trial court read Utah Code 
Annotated §76-3-203.1 and held that it was up to the trial judge, 
and not the jury, to enter findings of fact concerning defendant's 
conduct being in concert with two or more individuals for purposes 
of enhancing his penalty to a minimum six year term in the Utah 
State Prison. Under the United States and Utah Constitutions, a 
criminal defendant is entitled to have the facts determined by a jury. 
The statutory element of a defendant being in concert with two or 
more individuals is factual in nature regardless of what the 
legislature intends to call it. Additionally, even though the sentence 
is within the indeterminate sentence provided for a second degree 
felony, it is for a minimum term of six years, rather than the 
minimum term of one year for a regular second degree felony. The 
defendant is entitled to have the jury specifically find those facts, 
and not the trial judge. The issues left to the Judge should be the 
sentencing itself, not factual determinations which lead to enhanced 
penalties. 
The Court's finding that defendant engaged in conduct with 
Melanie Timmons was plain error. The evidence does not support 
such a conclusion, even when read in a light most favorable to the 
trial judge. 
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The defendant's conviction should be set aside as the Court 
committed error in making factual determinations that should be 
rightfully left to the jury. Additionally, the evidence was not 
sufficient to sustain the enhanced penalty. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. The defendant is entitled to have a jury 
determine the factual issue of his alleged involvement with 
two or more people. 
The defendant was sentenced under the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated §76-3-203.1. The pertinent provisions of the statute 
read as follows: 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more 
persons -- Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in 
Subsection (4) in concert with two or more persons is 
subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided 
below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this 
section means the defendant and two or more other 
persons would be criminally liable for the offense as 
parties under Section 76-2-202. 
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an 
indictment is returned, shall cause to be subscribed upon 
the complaint in misdemeanor cases or the information or 
indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is 
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this 
section. The notice shall be in a clause separate from and 
in addition to the substantive offense charged. 
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court 
may subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend the 
charging document to include the subscription if the court 
finds the charging documents, including any statement of 
probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the 
allegation he committed the offense in concert with two or 
more persons, or if the court finds the defendant has not 
otherwise been substantially prejudiced by the omission. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under 
this section are: 
* * * 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted 
person shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term 
of six years in prison. 
* * * 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, 
or 37c, regarding drug-related offenses; 
* * * 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense 
but provides an enhanced penalty for the primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties 
under this section that the persons with whom the actor is 
alleged to have acted in concert are not identified, 
apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those 
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or 
lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide 
whether to impose the enhanced penalty under this 
section. The imposition of the penalty is contingent upon a 
finding by the sentencing judge that this section is 
applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall 
enter written findings of fact concerning the applicability 
of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of 
the sentence required under this section if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; 
and 
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the 
disposition on the record and in writing. 
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The trial court made a determination that the legislature 
specifically authorized and allowed the trial judge, and not the jury, 
to make the factual determination, regarding a defendant's 
involvement with two or more persons, for the purpose of enhancing 
his penalty to a minimum six year term under the present case. The 
defendant in this particular case attacks the trial court's 
determinat ion. 
The defendant is entitled to have a jury determine all factual 
issues, under both the State and Federal Constitutions guaranteeing 
the defendant a right to a trial by jury. The Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides: 
AMENDMENT VI [Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury 
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Article I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except 
in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In 
courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four 
jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. 
In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a 
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verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless 
demanded. 
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure also mandates 
the defendants right to a jury trial. In Mel Hardman Productions. 
Inc. v. Robinson. 604 P2d 913 (Utah 1979) the Supreme Court stated: 
As we have numerous times indicated, the right of 
trial by jury is one which should be carefully safeguarded 
by the courts, and when a party had demanded such a 
trial, he is entitled to have the benefit of the jury's findings 
on issues of fact; and it is not the trial court's prerogative 
to disregard or nullify them by making findings of his own. 
Id. at 917. 
Even though a civil case, this rule should be equally applicable 
to criminal jury matters. 
The factual finding that the defendant engaged in criminal 
conduct in concert with two or more people provides the Court with 
an opportunity to sentence the defendant to a minimum six year 
term in the Utah State Prison for the second degree felony. 
While it is true that the six year term is within the 
indeterminate term of a second degree felony under Utah Statute, it 
does substantially deprive the defendant of rights he has in the 
criminal justice system. When convicted of a second degree felony, 
the indeterminate term of sentence is one to 15 years in the Utah 
State Prison. The defendant may be entitled to be paroled after one 
year on such a conviction. However, in the present situation, the trial 
judge himself was allowed to make a factual determination which in 
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reality increased the defendant's minimum term to six years in 
prison. As a result of the trial judge's factual determination, the 
defendant loses any possible right of parole in years 2 through 5. It 
is not possible at the time of sentencing to determine whether the 
defendant would have been paroled in years 2, 3, 4 or 5, however, 
that right was absolutely taken away from him because of a trial 
judge's factual determination. Under the guarantees of the Utah law 
and the Utah and United States Constitution, entitling the defendant 
to a trial by jury, such factual determination should have been made 
by that jury, as it resulted in the defendant losing substantial rights. 
The Court's finding that the defendant acted in concert with 
Melanie Timmons is inadequate and clearly against the weight of the 
evidence. It is interesting to note that the trial judge specifically 
found that Robert Larsen was too disbelievable to rely upon for the 
purpose of finding that the defendant acted in concert with him. 
This point of argument thus outlines the evidence as it applies to 
Melanie Timmons. The evidence adduced at trial would seemingly 
show the following facts and circumstances. Mary Nevarez testified 
that the defendant told her that he had arranged to meet Melanie 
Timmons in Mesquite, Nevada, for the last leg of the journey home. 
(T. 176). I believe it is undisputed that Melanie Timmons did ride 
with her boyfriend, Mary Nevarez and the defendant, from Mesquite, 
Nevada, to St. George, Utah, on the night in question. Yet, Mary 
Nevarez also testified that she did not know if Melanie Timmons ever 
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saw the drugs brought from the car into her house. (T. 208). Nor did 
she recall if Melanie was present when the defendant allegedly 
handed her the green bindle of methamphetamine. (T. 210). She 
testified that she gave Mr. Larsen the methamphetamine upstairs in 
his bedroom, which would have been out of the eye-sight of Melanie 
Timmons. (T. 211). The only connection that Melanie Timmons was 
involved is the one statement of Mary Nevarez that Art had told her 
that she was going to be involved. There was disputed evidence that 
Ms. Timmons used drugs with the defendant and Ms. Nevarez in Ms. 
Timmons1 home on their arrival from Mesquite, and also that she 
used drugs that morning in the Larsen home. However, the record 
provides no evidence that she was aware of where the drugs came 
from or of the alleged overall plan. From Ms. Nevarez1 testimony, 
there was no discussion of the drugs on the way to St. George, it is 
doubtful that Melanie Timmons saw any drugs being transported 
from the car into the house, and it was not possible for Melanie 
Timmons to have even seen the drugs being given to Mr. Larsen. 
This is the evidence marshaled in favor of the court's ruling. Such 
evidence is clearly too insubstantial to conclude that Melanie 
Timmons acted in concert with the defendant in this alleged drug 
deal. 
It is additionally shown, however, that both the defendant and 
Ms. Timmons testified that she was not involved with the defendant 
in relation to a drug transaction. Ms. Timmons testified that she had 
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voluntarily gone to Mesquite with a friend and ran into Art in 
Mesquite on the morning of New Year's. (T. 258). Therein, she also 
specifically stated that she had not talked to Art about meeting him 
on that occasion. She testified that on the way to St. George they did 
not have any discussion concerning drugs. (T. 260-261). This would 
seemingly substantiate the testimony of Mary Nevarez and would 
additionally seemingly not implicate Melanie Timmons in this 
transaction. The defendant thereafter testified that he simply ran 
into Melanie at the Casino in Mesquite, and offered her a ride home 
because her car was broken down. (T. 288). 
The court made a mistake and from the evidence it was clearly 
erroneous. With all the evidence marshaled in favor of the court, 
such ruling is still wrong and should be set aside. See State v. 
Murphv. 872 P2d 480, 482 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Walker. 743 
P2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); and State v. Chavez. 840 P2d 846, 848 
(Utah App. 1992). 
Even if the evidence is taken in the light most favorable to the 
trial judge's ruling, it is clearly inadequate to implicate Melanie 
Timmons in a common scheme with the defendant, and was an 
erroneous finding by the trial court. 
The trial court committed error in sentencing the defendant to 
a minimum term of six years under the statute, and his sentence 
should be reversed on that basis. 
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CONCLUSION 
The defendant's sentence to a minimum term of six years must 
be set aside and reversed. The defendant has a constitutional right 
to have factual issues which will lead to a deprivation of his rights 
heard by a jury. The legislature cannot take away those 
constitutional rights. Likewise, the court's findings are not supported 
by the testimony, and therefore the minimum six year term must be 
set aside. 
DATED this 14th day of April, 1997. 
^slst^sy^ 
.aMar J Wmward 
Attorney for defendant/appellant 
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